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By Aaron S. Kesselheim and Kevin Outterson
Fighting Antibiotic Resistance:
Marrying New Financial Incentives
To Meeting Public Health Goals
ABSTRACT The world faces a worsening public health crisis: A growing
number of bacteria are resistant to available antibiotics. Yet there are few
new antibiotics in the development pipeline to take the place of these
increasingly ineffective drugs. We review a number of proposals intended
to bolster drug development, including such financial incentives for
pharmaceutical manufacturers as extending the effective patent life for
new antibiotics. However, such strategies directly conflict with the clear
need to reduce unnecessary antibiotic prescriptions and could actually
increase prescription use. As an alternative, we recommend a two-prong,
“integrated” strategy. This would increase reimbursement for the
appropriate, evidence-based use of antibiotics that also met specific public
health goals—such as reducing illness levels while limiting antibiotic
resistance.
R
ising rates of antibiotic resistance
have become a clear public health
crisis.1 The trend is not limited to
the United States but is a world-
wide problem—so much so that
the World Health Organization considers anti-
biotic resistance an emerging threat to global
stability.2
The issue captured headlines in 2007 when
Andrew Speaker, a U.S. attorney who flew to
Europe for his wedding and honeymoon, poten-
tially exposed hundreds of international trav-
elers to extensively drug-resistant tuberculosis.
That form of TB is resistant to first- and second-
line drugs.3
Over the past two decades, hospitals and other
health care institutions have reported more in-
fections that are not treatable by standard thera-
pies.4,5 Community-acquired infections have also
demonstrated escalating patterns of antibiotic
resistance. For example, the frequency of com-
munity-acquired methicillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus increased more than sevenfold
from 1999 to 2006.6
Resistant microorganisms have implications
for individual patients as well as for health care
systems. Patients who acquire such infections
are at increased risk for death and disease.6 Such
patients canmore thandouble inpatient hospital
costs7 and account for increased outpatient treat-
ment costs8 and spending on long-term care.9
In recent years, a call to arms has arisen from
physicians,10 public health organizations, gov-
ernments, and leading academic groups such
as the Infectious Diseases Society of America11
and the Alliance for the Prudent Use of Anti-
biotics.12 Many proposals being offered to ad-
dress the issue of increasing antibiotic resistance
emphasize the need for additional incentives to
develop new generations of more power-
ful drugs.
In this paper we review the proposals.We also
argue that without an integrated focus on both
producing new drugs and making careful and
more limited use of existing ones—a strategy
called “conservation”—the world will not be able
to develop drugs fast enough to get ahead of the
resistance problem. We propose that one effec-
tive way to achieve this focus would be to tie
reimbursement for antibiotics more directly to
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objective evidence of appropriate prescription
rates and positive public health outcomes.
Background: The Problem Of
Antibiotic Resistance
When penicillin was first used in the United
States in 1942, physicians were optimistic about
the ability of modern medicine to defeat deadly
microorganisms.13 However, shortly after that
came the first report of penicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus.14 Since then, researchers have
uncovered many biological bases for resistance
to antibiotics, including naturally selected ge-
netic mutations in bacteria, the passage of mu-
tations between species, and the decrease in
nonpathogenic species of bacteria that allowed
deadly microorganisms to flourish.15
Societal factors accelerate the spread of resis-
tance. Undertreatment through suboptimal
doses or inadequate treatment durations—for
example, when a patient does not complete a
prescribed course of antibiotics—leads to resis-
tant strains of disease-causing microorganisms.
Resistance is also encouraged by unnecessary
treatment of viral or noninfectious diseases with
antibiotics and the use of broad-spectrum drugs
in patients whose infections could be treated
with more-targeted drugs.
The misuse of antibiotics in these ways is un-
fortunately common. Physicians may not be
aware of or adhere to clinical practice guidelines
for the proper use of drugs.16,17 Patient factors,
such as demand for antibiotics in inappropriate
clinical situations, contribute to the use of
unnecessary prescriptions.18
Pharmaceutical manufacturers also play a
role, through marketing campaigns aimed at in-
creasing sales. For example, in 2005 Pfizer was
warned by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) that its “misleading promotion” of
linezolid (Zyvox) as a treatment for a wide range
of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) infections “poses serious public health
and safety concerns because of its potential to
result in inappropriate use.” The FDA concluded
that the clinical trial data did not support
linezolid’s use for those conditions.19
Separately, Pfizer has settled a case in which it
was charged with promoting the use of the mac-
rolide antibiotic azithromycin (Zithromax) to
treat types of infections for which the drug
was known to have limited efficacy. Court docu-
ments alleged that the company’s motivation
was to “keep sales for Zithromax consistent over
the year.”20
Efforts To Control Antibiotic
Resistance
As resistance rates among microorganisms have
risen, so have concerns about whether enough
new antibiotics are being developed. The Infec-
tious Diseases Society of America reported that
the largest pharmaceutical companies produced
only five systemic antibacterial agents during
2003–7.21 FDA approvals in general have de-
clined in recent years, but given that resistance
is amore acute public health threat for infectious
diseases than for other medical conditions, a
vibrant pipeline of new antibiotics may be more
critical than the pipeline of other drugs—such as
a new proton-pump inhibitor for acid reflux, or
another statin to treat elevated cholesterol.
One industry leader has argued that antibiotic
development has slowed because the “low-hang-
ing fruit” has already been picked, and more-
substantial investment is required to develop
the next generation of products.22 And in fact,
pharmaceutical research and development is do-
minated by for-profit companies, which are
likely to set investment priorities on the basis
of projected revenues, rather than perceived
public health needs.23 The major problem in this
case is that the development of antibiotics is not
well reimbursed relative to that of other drugs,
such as treatments for cancer.24 There is no sub-
stantial investment in developing new antibiot-
ics because companies don’t expect them to
produce a substantial rate of return.25
Numerous strategies have been suggested to
address rising antibiotic resistance and a limited
developmentpipeline. The threemain categories
of such strategies are conserving the effective-
ness of existing antibiotic drugs, providing addi-
tional financial incentives to encourage drug
development, and reducing the drug develop-
ment costs.
Antibiotic Conservation: Infection
Control And Rational Use
Themost widely employedmethods of conserva-
tion are improved environmental infection con-
trol and rational prescription practices. In terms
of environmental infection control, routine
hand washing in an intensive care setting has
been shown to reduce rates of vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus (VRE), a bacterium that
can cause deadly blood infections.26 In some
well-regulated environments, rigorous infection
control has successfully limited antibiotic resis-
tance.27 A recent report suggests that hospital-
based conservation efforts in the United States
have reduced the incidence of certain methicil-
lin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus infections.28
Encouraging the rational use of antibiotics
Public Health
1690 Health Affairs September 2010 29:9
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1709389 
often entails active supervision of physicians’
prescribingpractices. Suchprograms include ed-
ucating physicians about evidence-based pre-
scribing practices, known as “academic
detailing”;29 the development of treatment
guidelines;30 and restrictions that exclude cer-
tain antibiotics from clinical use or require prior
authorization for their use. Rational-use pro-
grams impose increased requirements on spe-
cialists in infectious diseases but can still be
cost-effective and lead to positive public health
outcomes. In thedecentralizedU.S. system, indi-
vidual institutions may be reluctant to invest in
societally advantageous programs because some
of the benefits would inevitably accrue to unaf-
filiated neighboring institutions, perhaps direct
competitors.
Experience has also shown that both infection
control and rational prescription practices have
important limitations. Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus has passed between pa-
tients isolated in different rooms or areas of a
hospital.32 In theUnitedStates, the varying levels
of commitment to conservation on the part of
hospitals and other health care institutions can
also limit the strategy’s overall effectiveness. No-
tably, infection control measures are generally
not reimbursed. To the degree that institutions
have financial inducements to engage in infec-
tion control, these are largely punitive and occur
after the fact, instead of beingpositive incentives
to support infection control ahead of time.
Under recent Medicare guidelines, for example,
hospitals will be assessed a financial penalty for
inpatients who acquire certain catheter-associ-
ated infections, whether or not the infection was
avoidable.33
Supply-Side Incentives For New Drug
Development
Policymakers have sought to address rising anti-
biotic resistance by proposing additional finan-
cial incentives for drug manufacturers.
Patent Term Extension One proposal is to
extend the period of effective patent life granted
to new antibiotics. Drug patents have a statutory
lifetime of twenty years, but the effective patent
length is shorter because of the amount of time
the drug approval process takes.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has suggested that patents could be
lengthened “to 25 or 30 years” for important
antibiotics with “high therapeutic potential.”34
Othershave argued for starting thepatentperiod
when regulatory approval is granted,35 or extend-
ing antibiotic patents foreven longerperiods.36,37
Longer patent terms would give sponsors
more time in which to earn revenues. But the
real benefits would not accrue until after the
current twenty-year patent termends,which lim-
its the impact of the extra time on a company’s
bottom line in the present.38Many other trouble-
some questions are also raised by the idea of
extending the patent term, including the diffi-
culty ofmodifyingpatent law for a discrete sector
such as antimicrobials without creating unan-
ticipated effects in other drug classes.
Linking Antibiotic Development To Other
Rights Another alternative involves linkinganti-
biotic development to supplementarymarket ex-
clusivity rights that could be transferred to other
drugs, also known as “wildcard patents.” For
example, if Pfizer developed a new antibiotic,
the FDA might grant six months of market ex-
clusivity that Pfizer could apply instead to its
blockbuster cholesterol-lowering drug atorva-
statin (Lipitor), whose U.S. market exclusivity
is scheduled to expire in 2011. An analysis by
Kevin Outterson and others estimated that ten
wildcard patents could cost as much as $40 bil-
lion.38 An expenditure of this magnitude, how-
ever, is likely to be wasteful and would act as a
hidden tax on common conditions such as high
cholesterol. Shifting funds among disease cat-
egories in a haphazard fashion, detached from
market signals, might hurt more patients than
the strategy would help.38,39
Other Incentives Finally, some “supply side”
proposals focus on non-patent-related in-
centives.
▸▸ORPHAN DRUG ACT: TheOrphanDrugAct of
1983 encourages research into therapeutic
agents for rare conditions and gives manufac-
turers federal funding and research tax credits,
as well as enhanced market exclusivity rights. In
recent legislation, Congress asked the FDA to
study how the act might be applied to antibiotics
developed to treat “serious and life threatening
infectious diseases” caused by “antibiotic-resist-
ant bacteria.”40 But many antibiotics and other
antimicrobials have already received orphan
drug designation, so it is not clear how much
extending the law would accomplish.
▸▸PRIZES AND BUYOUTS: Other analysts and
academics have recommended using a prize to
encourage research in this area. The public
health payoff would come when the ultimate
product was dissociated from the patent system
and entered the public domain, where it could be
sold more cheaply.41 Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
recently proposed an $80 billion prize fund to
encourage research, although the plan did not
receive much further attention in the Senate.42
Similar to a prize would be offering generous
patent buyouts. A patent buyout involves pur-
chasing the patent and marketing exclusivity
rights and offering open, nonexclusive, no-
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royalty licenses as necessary. The “first in class”
drugs developed could then be held in a “stra-
tegic antibiotic reserve” and saved for future
crises.43
Prize proposals face financing and implemen-
tation barriers. However, they may represent a
substantial evolution in the thinking behind
global pharmaceutical development, especially
for fighting high-priority disease-causingmicro-
organismsandwhere existingdrugdevelopment
pipelines are weak.44
Reducing Drug Development Costs
A third category of proposals seeks to reduce the
investment expense of creating a new antibiotic.
One way of achieving such a goal is through
increasing public or nonprofit funding of basic
research on infectious diseases. The Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation, for example, funds
research on the basic biology of tuberculosis45
and how to manage the increase of extensively
drug-resistant tuberculosis.46 However, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) spends only
about $200 million per year on such “upstream”
antimicrobial resistance–related research.47 Sus-
tained increases in basic research budgets would
benefit “downstream” research and ultimately
the public’s health. Investment at this level could
be more cost-effective than extensive changes in
patent law—for example, if a new receptor or
mechanism is discovered that serves as the basis
for numerous subsequent products. Still, the
need to incentivize involvement of “down-
stream” pharmaceutical manufacturers would
remain.
Another way to affect development costs is by
adjusting certain regulatory standards. Anti-
biotics are usually tested against a control drug
known to be effective against the bacterium in
question, to demonstrate that the experimental
antibiotic is not inferior to the standard treat-
ment. Such “non-inferiority” trials can be com-
plicated for investigators to design, and
achieving useful results often requires enrolling
more patients and investing additional time and
money than would be required in a placebo-
controlled trial. Therefore, industry sources
have pointed out that relaxing benchmarks for
statistical significance in these trials could cut
development costs.48
Short of major changes in regulatory stan-
dards, some proactive steps can be taken to
streamline the regulatory process, including
publishing guidelines to reduce uncertainty
about FDA expectations for clinical trials and
actively working with drug developers early in
the process to provide feedback about imple-
menting these recommendations.49 The Infec-
tious Diseases Society of America and the FDA
recently held a joint meeting to consider guide-
lines for developing new antibiotics to treat
pneumonia. Creating such guidelines for emerg-
ing infectious disease threats could help make
the regulatory process for potential antibiotic
sponsors more transparent.50
However, adjusting the regulatory process
may not have much of an effect. Historically,
approved antibiotics have had among the short-
est clinical development times of any drug
class.51 There may also be important disadvan-
tages to loosening regulatory requirements, as
reduced premarket testing may lead to an in-
creased risk of the emergence of dangerous side
effects after approval.52
For the most important antibiotics, it may be
worth taking these additional risks, but the re-
laxation of premarketing hurdles would require
careful surveillance of drug safety after FDA ap-
proval. Although currently in development, ef-
fective systems for postmarketing surveillance
have not yet been implemented.
An Integrated Response To The
Antibiotic Resistance Crisis
One of the primary themes to emerge from the
efforts to address growing antibiotic resistance
is that current programs for antibiotic conserva-
tion and production work at cross-purposes to
each other. The growing popularity of infection
control and limits on antibiotic use contributes
to depressed sales of new products. Depressed
sales in turn have prompted large pharmaceut-
ical manufacturers to abandon new antibiotic
research.
However, supply-side incentives—particularly
those that provide longer periods of market ex-
clusivity or allow drugs to come to market
sooner—do not directly address bacterial resis-
tance. Because future spending on pharmaceut-
ical products is unpredictable, patent owners
may choose to maximize short-term revenues,
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may encourage the broad use of an antibiotic so
they can sell more of the drug. If there are other
manufacturerswith antibiotics in the same class,
this anticonservation pressure will spread to
those competitors. The damage in terms of re-
sistance may then be even more acute, because
bacteria may develop cross-resistance among
drugs with similar mechanisms of action.
Value-Based Reimbursement
A more rational incentive structure would pro-
mote conservationwhile creatinga viablemarket
for investment in antibiotic research and devel-
opment. In the United States, antibiotics have
traditionally been low-price products.53 The soci-
etal value of activities such as hospital infection
control programs greatly exceeds the value
placed on them by private-sector and govern-
ment payers.We suggest applying the principles
of value-based reimbursement to paying for con-
tinued antibiotic effectiveness.
Take, for example, a new drug, or a conserva-
tion program for an existing drug, that treats or
reduces vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus and
leads to fewer intensive care unit admissions
for patients with this infection. A value-based
reimbursement plan would allow part of the sav-
ings to be shared with the manufacturer of the
product and with the hospital that put the infec-
tion control program in place. Under such a pro-
posal, the combined increase in antibiotic
reimbursement should be substantial—amount-
ing to at least several billion dollars a year. This
approach would close some of the gap between
the private cost and societal value of antibiotics.
Linking potential revenues to the appropriate
use of a product has more and more precedents
in pharmaceutical markets. In some markets,
government-related expert bodies make value-
based assessments of available medical technol-
ogy. England’s National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence, for example, recently evalu-
ated medications available for Alzheimer’s dis-
ease and concluded that the evidence did not
justify their cost and widespread use.54 Austra-
lia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme has many
years of experience in evaluating population-
level reimbursement based on health impact.55
We envision a similar system for evaluating
antibiotic effectiveness and providing fair pay-
ments for societal benefit. The resulting dra-
matic increases in antibiotic reimbursement
would jump-start innovation for new antibiotics.
Conservation-Based Market
Exclusivity
As we have noted, the current market exclusivity
system can contribute to misuse of new anti-
biotics because manufacturers earn revenue by
encouraging the widespread use of their prod-
ucts before their patents expire. Many proposals
to increase market exclusivity to spur drug re-
search and development do not address this
problem sufficiently.
As an alternative, we suggest a conservation-
based market exclusivity strategy, whereby the
FDA would set specific effectiveness targets for
each antibiotic. Just as the FDA consults with
expert advisory committees on the approval of
new drugs, it could consult with appropriate ex-
perts from the NIH and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). Ideally, these ex-
perts would be free from substantial conflicts of
interest.
In the deliberations, factors such as disease
morbidity, the effectiveness of current treatment
strategies, and the rate of emerging resistance
wouldbeused to set thepublichealthgoals. If the
observeddatamet the target andequitable access
to the drug was observed, the company would
continue to enjoy marketing exclusivity. For ex-
ample, for a drug developed to treat vancomycin-
resistant Enterococcus, the target could be lower
resistance rates or reduced morbidity from re-
lated illness in a sample of U.S. health care in-
stitutions.
Certainly, this strategy would require addi-
tional investment in improved surveillance of
antibiotic use and development of resistance.
Some of the proposed objective criteria for
assessing proper antibiotic use may be unpre-
dictable. For example, resistance may emerge
at a more accelerated rate than anticipated.
But, as with any regulatory function, there
should be some flexibility, and themanufacturer
should be given the opportunity to explain its
results to the oversight committee. If themarket-
ingpractices andusagepatterns are appropriate,
then the manufacturer could retain market ex-
clusivity. This flexibility should increase the ap-
Incentives that
include public health
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peal of this scheme to participating pharma-
ceutical companies.
Finally, because resistance can cross species
and diminish the effectiveness of antibiotics
both within and across classes of drugs, the im-
plementation of this program would be im-
proved if the Federal Trade Commission and
the Department of Justice permitted manufac-
turers to coordinate the marketing, sale, and
proper use of important antibiotics.
Conclusion
As microorganisms resistant to available thera-
pies continue to emerge, there is concern from
many sides that the current supply of antibiotics
is not sufficient to meet the growing demand.
Most proposed solutions provide additional in-
centives to encourage investment by pharma-
ceutical manufacturers. Few of the proposals
take into account the fact that the profit-making
incentives of manufacturers can be at odds with
public health programs intended to limit anti-
biotic use and limit resistance.
As an alternative, we have outlined a way to
better align manufacturer and public health in-
centives. Enhanced reimbursement for anti-
biotics commensurate with their societal value,
along with market exclusivity tied to clinically
rational use of the drugs, would allow everyone
to benefit from the use of the antibiotics in sit-
uations most likely to reduce deaths caused by
infection.
These programs would also encourage manu-
facturers to create programs to restrict clinically
inappropriate use of their products, such as co-
operating with—and funding—hospital-based
infection control efforts. At the same time, en-
hanced public investment in resistance research
could improveknowledgeaboutdrug targets and
foster more development of antibiotics. For
drugs that ultimately emerge from public invest-
ment programs, the government should receive
an appropriate share of the enhanced reimburse-
ment by payers.
Incentives that include public health goals are
essential to avoiding the various unintended
consequences and the misuse that have fre-
quently characterized themarket for antibiotics.
The same incentives may offer legitimate hope
for addressing the growing public health crisis
posed by antibiotic resistance. ▪
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